Nigeria & South Korea Trade Brief 2026
Crude goes east; polymers, machines and metal come back. Nigeria’s trade balance with South Korea moved from a $265.9m deficit in 2021 to a $1.1bn surplus in 2024.
Executive summary
Crude goes east; polymers, machines and metal come back. That is the Nigeria-South Korea trade relationship in one line. Two-way goods trade was $2.25bn in 2021, $2.80bn in 2022, $1.82bn in 2023 and $2.50bn in 2024. By Nigerian standards Korea is a mid-table partner: between the 12th and 18th largest destination for Nigerian goods over the period, and between roughly the 10th and 20th largest source of imports. It took 1.71% to 2.81% of Nigeria’s exports and supplied 1.03% to 2.20% of its imports.
The balance has turned decisively in Nigeria’s favour. After a $265.9m deficit in 2021, the Trade Explorer records Nigerian surpluses of $821.8m in 2022, $433.2m in 2023 and $1.1bn in 2024, roughly $2.1bn over the four years. The swing came from both ends at once. Nigerian exports to Korea rose 81% between 2021 and 2024; Korean goods entering Nigeria fell 45%.
Nigeria sells Korea one product, with a copper trim. Mineral fuels, Nigerian crude, made up 86.2% to 94.4% of exports every year, worth between $903.0m and $1.7bn. Copper was the second line in all four years ($57.3m to $127.5m), and in 2024 Korea bought 16.4% of all the copper Nigeria exported. Oil seeds, mainly sesame, rose seven-fold to $30.3m, and vessels appeared as a new $31.5m to $39.2m line from 2023.
Korea’s sales to Nigeria have lost their fuel and are now losing their plastic. Refined petroleum was Korea’s largest export to Nigeria in 2021 at $480.9m. By 2024 it was $20.4m, a 95.8% fall after Nigeria ended the petrol subsidy and began refining at scale. Plastics, now the top line, fell from $343.4m to $193.3m, and Korea’s share of Nigeria’s plastics imports slipped from 11.1% to 8.1%. What grew was industrial: machinery and electrical equipment rose 54.7% to $168.0m, and Korea’s share of Nigeria’s aluminium imports nearly doubled to 12.6%.
2026 has made Nigerian crude strategically interesting to Seoul. Before the Iran war, about 61% of Korea’s crude imports and 54% of its naphtha passed through the Strait of Hormuz. Middle Eastern crude arrivals in May were 32% lower than a year earlier, the government has said it wants regular crude supply channels from Africa, and African arrivals, led by Nigeria, rose roughly seven-fold year on year in April. On 22 September in Abuja, marking 46 years of relations, Korea’s ambassador pressed Nigeria on practical fixes: foreign-exchange access, customs, and ratification of a tax treaty signed in 2006.
Key findings
Shift to Consistent Surplus
Nigeria moved from a $265.9m deficit in 2021 to a substantial $1.1bn surplus by 2024, driven by rising crude exports and falling Korean imports.
Crude dominates, with smaller non-fuel opportunities
Mineral fuels supplied 86.2% to 94.4% of exports in 2021–2024. Copper was second every year, while sesame-led oil seeds rose from $4.3m to $30.3m.
Collapse of Refined Fuel Imports
Korean refined petroleum exports to Nigeria fell by 95.8% between 2021 and 2024 as Nigeria scaled up domestic refining capacity.
An opening in Korea’s crude sourcing
The brief reports Nigerian-led African crude arrivals rising roughly seven-fold year on year in April 2026 as Korean refiners sought supplies outside the Strait of Hormuz.
Industrial Resilience
Machinery and electrical equipment exports from Korea to Nigeria rose 54.7% to $168.0m between 2021 and 2024. Korea’s share of Nigeria’s aluminium imports rose from 6.7% to 12.6%.
Institutional Delays
The Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement signed in 2006 remains unratified after 20 years, acting as a primary discouragement for Korean investors.
Maritime Synergies
Korean shipyards dominate global LNG carrier construction, aligning with Nigeria's fleet renewal and LNG expansion goals.
| Year | Nigeria to Korea | Korea to Nigeria | Total Trade | Balance (panel) | Cover | Share of NGA Exports | Share of NGA Imports |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $991.9m | $1.26bn | $2.25bn | -$265.9m | 0.79x | 1.71% | 2.20% |
| 2022 | $1.8bn | $1.0bn | $2.80bn | +$821.8m | 1.80x | 2.51% | 1.55% |
| 2023 | $1.13bn | $694.1m | $1.82bn | +$433.2m | 1.62x | 1.82% | 1.03% |
| 2024 | $1.8bn | $697.7m | $2.50bn | +$1.1bn | 2.58x | 2.81% | 1.45% |
| Product (HS chapter) | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mineral fuels, oils and distillation products (Ch. 27) | $903.0m | $1.70bn | $972.0m | $1.60bn | 86.2% to 94.4% of total every year |
| Copper and articles thereof (Ch. 74) | $57.3m | $127.5m | $78.1m | $75.3m | Second line every year; 16.4% of NGA copper exports (2024) |
| Ships, boats and floating structures (Ch. 89) | n/a | n/a | $31.5m | $39.2m | New line from 2023 |
| Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits, mainly sesame (Ch. 12) | $4.3m | $7.4m | $27.8m | $30.3m | Up seven-fold since 2021 |
| Lead and articles thereof (Ch. 78) | $21.9m | $14.6m | $1.9m | $0.46m | Down from $21.9m to under $0.5m |
| Other ranked products (residual, 5 to 6 further lines a year) | $4.5m | $16.2m | $15.2m | $23.3m | Aluminium, wood, ores, electronics |
| TOTAL (ranked products shown) | $991.0m | $1.87bn | $1.13bn | $1.77bn | 98.3% to 103.7% of reported total |
| Product (HS chapter) | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Plastics and articles thereof (Ch. 39) | $343.4m | $334.2m | $225.3m | $193.3m | First line since 2022; down 43.7% |
| Mineral fuels and refined products (Ch. 27) | $480.9m | $244.3m | $17.8m | $20.4m | First line in 2021; down 95.8% |
| Machinery, mechanical appliances and parts (Ch. 84) | $59.1m | $56.3m | $78.7m | $80.6m | Present all 4 years; up 36.4% |
| Electrical machinery and electronics (Ch. 85) | $49.5m | $36.4m | $34.8m | $87.4m | Present all 4 years; up 151% in 2024 |
| Aluminium and articles thereof (Ch. 76) | $61.1m | $49.6m | $61.9m | $72.4m | 12.6% of NGA aluminium imports (2024) |
| Organic chemicals (Ch. 29) | $56.2m | $54.7m | $60.5m | $40.7m | Present all 4 years |
| Other ranked products (residual, 4 further lines a year) | $101.1m | $88.6m | $95.7m | $95.6m | Vehicles, fish, steel articles, used clothing |
| TOTAL (ranked products shown) | $1.15bn | $864.1m | $574.7m | $590.4m | 82.8% to 91.5% of reported total |
| Factor | Status (September 2026) | Implication |
|---|---|---|
| Korean crude diversification | Middle East crude to Korea −32% y/y in May; Seoul seeking regular African supply; Nigerian-led African arrivals up about 7x y/y in April | Primary driver of Nigeria’s exports and surplus |
| Oil prices and Hormuz | Brent $96.84 to $101.61 (23 to 24 Sept); Saudi East-West pipeline restarted 22 Sept; US-Iran talks ongoing | Each $10/bbl moves fuel exports to Korea by about $200m at 2024 volumes |
| Competition for Atlantic barrels | Korean refiners paying premiums for US crude; Canadian crude target of 16m bbl in 2026 | Nigerian grades must win on price and reliability, not geography alone |
| Nigerian output ceiling | Crude about 1.5m bpd in August, at OPEC quota | Caps how far the crude leg can scale |
| Polymer substitution | Dangote PP (830kt) running; +750kt propylene planned; Korea cutting 2.7 to 3.7mt of cracker capacity | Korea’s largest export line to Nigeria keeps shrinking |
| LNG disruption | QatarEnergy force majeure on long-term contracts incl. Korea | Opening for Nigerian LNG cargoes, if supply allows |
| Treaty and framework | Tax treaty signed 2006, unratified; framework MOU pending; no trade agreement | Ratification is a low-cost signal to Korean investors |
| Korea’s Africa finance | $10bn ODA and $14bn export finance pledged to 2030 | Funds Korean-built projects; lifts machinery and equipment imports |
| Nigerian monetary and FX | MPR cut to 23% on 22 Sept; inflation 15.39%; reserves about $55bn; ₦1,331/$ | Supports recovery in demand for Korean industrial goods |
| Nigerian tariffs and elections | 127 lines cut from April 2026; vehicle tariff 70% → 40%; poll 16 Jan 2027 | Cheaper Korean vehicles and inputs; policy-continuity risk |
Bilateral trade snapshot
The trade line zigzags because the crude line zigzags. Nigerian exports to Korea went from $991.9m in 2021 to $1.8bn in 2022 (+81.5%), fell 37.4% to $1.13bn in 2023, then rebounded 59.7% to $1.8bn in 2024. The Korean side moved in only one direction. Imports from Korea fell from $1.26bn in 2021 to $1.0bn in 2022 (−20.5%) and $694.1m in 2023 (−30.6%), then held at $697.7m in 2024. Total trade peaked at $2.80bn in 2022 and recovered to $2.50bn in 2024, but on a different footing: in 2021 Nigeria bought more from Korea than it sold; by 2024 it sold 2.6 times as much as it bought.
2021 is the only deficit year in the series, and it was a fuel year. Nigeria’s $265.9m deficit was smaller than the $480.9m it paid Korean refiners for petroleum products that year; without that one line, the balance would already have been in surplus. From 2022 the balance ran +$821.8m, +$433.2m and +$1.1bn. (Balances are quoted as reported in the Trade Explorer’s bilateral panel; because the 2022 and 2024 headline flows are rounded to $0.1bn, subtracting one from the other can differ from the panel by up to $0.05bn.) Across the four years Nigeria’s cumulative surplus with Korea was about $2.1bn, nearly all of it earned since 2022.
Korea’s weight in Nigeria’s trade is modest, but the direction is clear. Its share of Nigeria’s exports rose from 1.71% in 2021 to 2.81% in 2024, the highest in the series, while its share of Nigeria’s imports fell from 2.20% to 1.45%, bottoming at 1.03% in 2023. The two shares crossed in 2022 and have not converged since. In ranking terms Korea climbed from about 18th to 12th among Nigeria’s export markets and slipped from about 10th to 15th among its suppliers. For Nigeria, Korea is becoming more of a customer and less of a supplier.
Export profile: crude, copper and sesame
Nigeria’s export basket to Korea is crude oil with a handful of metal and farm lines attached. Mineral fuels, oils and distillation products (Ch. 27) were worth $903.0m in 2021 (91.0% of the total), $1.7bn in 2022 (94.4%), $972.0m in 2023 (86.2%) and $1.6bn in 2024 (88.9%). The swings follow price and cargo timing rather than any structural shift: Brent averaged close to $100 in 2022 before falling back, and Korean refiners have historically bought West African grades opportunistically, on the spot market, when freight and pricing to North Asia made sense. Korea took between 1.76% and 2.92% of Nigeria’s global fuel exports, a small slice, but one that grew by two-thirds over the period.
Import profile: fuel, polymers and industrial goods
Korea’s exports to Nigeria have lost one of their three pillars and are losing a second. The first was refined fuel. Mineral fuels from Korea, petrol, diesel and other products from refineries in Ulsan, Yeosu and Seosan, were the largest single line in 2021 at $480.9m, 38.2% of the total. They fell to $244.3m in 2022, then collapsed to $17.8m in 2023 and $20.4m in 2024. Nigeria’s removal of the petrol subsidy in 2023 and the start-up of large-scale domestic refining explain the fall; Korea’s share of Nigeria’s fuel import bill dropped from 4.1% to 0.15%. Nigeria has since become a net exporter of middle distillates, and its net gasoline imports fell to a record low of about 40,000 barrels a day in September 2025.
Bilateral relationship assessment
Each side is exposed to the other through a different channel. Nigeria’s exports depend on Korean refiners’ crude slate, a calculation about freight, grade and chokepoint risk made in Ulsan and Seosan. Korea’s exports depend on whether Nigerian industry keeps buying imported inputs or starts making them. Korean plastics sales to Nigeria fell by $150.1m over four years and Korea lost three points of Nigeria’s plastics market. Over the same period Nigerian buyers cut their aluminium imports overall but kept buying from Korea, so Korea’s share of that market almost doubled.
Trade framework and institutional channels
There is no free-trade agreement, economic partnership agreement or trade and investment promotion framework between Nigeria and Korea. Trade runs on WTO most-favoured-nation terms, with Nigeria applying the ECOWAS Common External Tariff as amended by its 2026 Fiscal Policy Measures. At the 2024 Korea-Africa Summit, Seoul pledged to speed up economic partnership agreements and trade frameworks with African states; it opened its first African partnership negotiations and signed promotion frameworks with eight countries at an early stage of cooperation. Nigeria was not among them, although its trade minister met Korea’s trade minister on the sidelines. In March 2025, Korea’s ambassador said the partnership would grow with the finalisation of the tax treaty and a framework MOU. Neither has been concluded.
Structural context: Korea’s search for crude supply
Korea’s energy system was built around the Gulf. Before the Iran war, roughly 61% of its crude imports and 54% of its naphtha imports passed through the Strait of Hormuz. Since March, Seoul has improvised on several fronts at once. It let refiners borrow crude from the strategic reserve against delayed cargoes, sent the president’s chief of staff to Kazakhstan, Oman and Saudi Arabia as a special envoy, and routed tankers through the Red Sea and the Saudi port of Yanbu. Middle Eastern crude arrivals in May were 39.42 million barrels, 32% lower than a year earlier; refiners still secured 87.7% of their five-year average monthly intake. Korea now aims to lift Canadian crude imports to as much as 16 million barrels in 2026 and says it wants regular crude supply channels from Africa.
The polymer squeeze
Korea’s largest export to Nigeria is being squeezed from both ends. At home, Korea’s petrochemical industry is in managed retreat: in August 2025 ten producers agreed to cut between 2.7 and 3.7 million tonnes of naphtha-cracking capacity, up to a quarter of the national total of 14.7 million tonnes, after petrochemical exports fell 11.1% in the first half of that year. The 2026 naphtha disruption through Hormuz has added a feedstock problem to a margin problem. In Nigeria, the Dangote complex began producing polypropylene in March 2025 and signed an export deal with Vinmar; in April 2026 it chose Honeywell technology to add 750,000 tonnes a year of propylene and 400,000 tonnes a year of linear alkylbenzene, the main input for detergents. That last detail matters here: soaps and cleaning preparations were a $18.9m Korean line into Nigeria in 2023. The likely result is a continued decline in Korean resin sales to Nigeria, with Korean value shifting toward specialty grades, additives and plant equipment.
Metal, machines and the maritime link
Metals run in both directions. Nigeria sells Korea copper and small amounts of aluminium; Korea sells Nigeria aluminium products worth $72.4m. The copper line carries a regulatory risk: scrap metal is on Nigeria’s Export Prohibition List, and customs has made arrests over illegal scrap shipments, so the trade depends on processed and properly documented material. On the machinery side, Korean brands are embedded in Nigeria’s industrial base: Kia opened a 25,000-unit assembly plant in Lagos with its local partner, and Hyundai vehicles are assembled locally by the Stallion Group. Nigeria’s April 2026 tariff reforms cut duties on 127 tariff lines and lowered the effective tariff on fully built passenger vehicles from 70% to 40%, which should support Korean vehicle and parts sales. The maritime link is newer: the ship line in Nigeria’s exports suggests Nigerian-operated vessels are already moving through Korean yards, the world’s leading builders of LNG carriers.
Nigeria: rate reset, recovering demand and the election clock
Nigeria’s capacity to pay for Korean goods is improving. Real GDP grew 4.43% in the second quarter of 2026, inflation eased to 15.39% in August, and the naira has held near ₦1,331/$. On 22 September the CBN cut its policy rate by 350 basis points to 23%, the largest single cut since December 2006, describing the move as an operational reset to improve transmission rather than a loosening of stance; the governor put external reserves at about $55bn. Cheaper credit and a steadier currency favour exactly the Korean goods that have been growing: machinery, electronics and aluminium. There is also an energy angle beyond crude: QatarEnergy’s force majeure on long-term LNG contracts, including those with Korea, leaves Korean buyers looking for replacement gas, which Nigeria LNG could supply if it has cargoes to spare. The main risk is political. The presidential election on 16 January 2027 brings the usual pressure on FX management, fiscal policy and trade rules, and any reversal of the 2026 tariff reforms would reach this relationship quickly.
Our assessment: scenarios for 2025 to 2027
SysIN’s base case, built from the 2024 product composition and explicit price, volume and growth drivers (described in the PDF), sees Nigerian exports to Korea dipping to about $1.59bn in 2025, when Brent averaged roughly $69, then jumping to about $2.69bn in 2026 as Korean refiners take around 40% more Nigerian crude than in 2024 at higher prices. Exports ease to about $2.24bn in 2027 as Brent settles near $80 and volumes hold 25% above 2024. Korean goods entering Nigeria edge up to roughly $703m, $733m and $765m: machinery, electronics and aluminium grow 5% to 10% a year while plastics shrink 8% to 12% a year as Nigerian polymer output displaces imports. Nigeria’s surplus widens from $1.1bn in 2024 to about $1.96bn in 2026 and $1.48bn in 2027, and two-way trade reaches about $3.42bn in 2026, above its 2022 peak. These are scenario estimates, not data: the Trade Explorer series ends in 2024.
Priorities for a trade ministry or policy body
The first step is to clear the backlog. Ratifying the 2006 Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement and concluding the Trade and Investment Promotion Framework would cost little and answer the Korean side’s most specific complaint. The larger prize is an energy-security arrangement: a term crude (and, where Nigeria LNG has capacity, gas) framework with Korean refiners and KNOC, ideally tied to Korean participation in Nigerian storage, terminals or midstream assets so that Korea’s search for non-Gulf supply leaves investment behind rather than just cargoes. Nigeria should also direct Korea’s $10bn ODA and $14bn export-finance envelope toward projects that use Korean equipment in refining, petrochemicals, power and ports, and act on the FX-access and customs issues the ambassador raised on 22 September. Formalising copper processing and traceability would protect a line that is exposed to the scrap-export prohibition.
Priorities for a commercial institution or investor
The clearest near-term flow is trade finance, freight and hedging for Korea-bound crude cargoes while the Hormuz premium lasts, sized for the downside in which it disappears within a year. The durable opportunities sit where Korean imports are being replaced: Nigerian plastics converters switching to local polypropylene, Korean suppliers of specialty resins, additives and processing equipment repositioning for that market, and machinery, electronics and vehicle distribution that benefits from the rate reset and the 2026 tariff cuts. Sesame and other oil-seed exporters with Korean food-safety certification have room to grow from a small base. Any commitment made before February 2027 should price in election-season risk to FX and trade policy.
Data sources and limitations
All bilateral trade flows are sourced from OEC BACI (Trade Explorer, UN Comtrade harmonised). Values are in USD and product classification follows the Harmonised System at chapter level. This brief covers goods trade only; services trade is not captured.
Disclaimer
This report is produced by SysIN Insights solely for informational purposes and does not constitute investment advice, a solicitation, or an offer to buy or sell any security or financial instrument. The analytical views expressed reflect the professional judgment of SysIN analysts based on publicly available information, including official trade statistics, company and government disclosures, and published research and news as cited. Nothing in this report should be construed as a personalised recommendation or as legal, tax, or regulatory advice. Recipients should conduct their own independent due diligence and consult a qualified and appropriately licensed adviser before making any investment or policy decision.
Frequently asked questions
What was Nigeria’s trade balance with South Korea in 2024?
As of 2024, Nigeria holds a surplus of $1.1 billion. The balance has been in Nigeria's favor since 2022, following a deficit in 2021.
Why did Korean refined fuel exports to Nigeria collapse?
Korean fuel exports fell by 95.8% due to Nigeria removing the petrol subsidy in 2023 and the commencement of large-scale domestic refining.
How significant is Nigerian copper to the South Korean market?
In 2024, South Korea absorbed 16.4% of all the copper Nigeria exported, making it the second-largest export line to Korea consistently.
What major institutional barrier exists for Korean investors in Nigeria?
At the brief’s September 2026 assessment, the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement signed in 2006 remained unratified. The report identifies this delay, alongside FX access and customs procedures, as an obstacle to investment.
What is the outlook for Nigerian crude exports to Korea?
The brief’s base case projects Nigerian exports to Korea of about $2.69bn and a surplus of about $1.96bn in 2026. These are SysIN scenario estimates, not reported trade data; the underlying series ends in 2024.