Nigeria & Japan Trade Brief 2026

A small, consistently surplus corridor with a growing non-oil base: Nigeria’s non-fuel exports to Japan rose 88.9% to $489.4m between 2021 and 2024, led by metals and sesame.

Executive summary

Japan is one of the few major industrial economies with which Nigeria runs a surplus in every year of the dataset, a small corridor, but a structurally favourable one. Two-way Nigeria-Japan goods trade ranged between $1.00bn and $1.68bn a year over 2021 to 2024. Nigeria’s surplus was + $413.0m (2021), +$991.7m (2022), +$133.1m (2023) and +$458.3m (2024), and Nigerian exports exceeded imports from Japan by a factor of between 1.3 and 3.9. Japan nevertheless remains a marginal partner by scale, taking only 0.9% to 1.9% of Nigeria’s exports and supplying 0.5% to 0.8% of its imports.

Energy drives the volatility, but it no longer defines the corridor. Mineral fuels, crude oil and liquefied natural gas, supplied $523.9m (2021) and $953.1m (2022) of Nigeria’s exports to Japan before collapsing 85% to $142.2m in 2023 and recovering to $359.1m in 2024. Their share of the export total fell from 71.3% in 2022 to 25.0% in 2023 and 42.3% in 2024. In 2023, for the first time in the series, Aluminium articles ($182.9m) displaced fuel as Nigeria’s largest export to Japan.

Nigeria’s non-fuel exports to Japan have risen in every year and nearly doubled since 2021. Non-fuel exports grew from $259.1m (2021) to $383.2m (2022), $426.7m (2023) and $489.4m (2024), up 88.9%. Two baskets carry the growth: aluminium and copper, which rose from $172.3m to $339.8m, and oil seeds, overwhelmingly sesame, which rose from $75.2m to $144.6m. Nigeria is now Japan’s largest sesame supplier, with an estimated 31% to 40% of the Japanese market. This is a genuinely

Cars, tractors, trucks & parts rose from $89.7m (2021) to $212.3m (2024), up 136.7%, and from 24.2% to 54.4% of all Japanese exports to Nigeria. Everything else Japan sells Nigeria fell by about a third, from $280.3m to $177.9m: Man-made staple fibres, the largest line in 2021 at $106.4m, fell to $49.9m, and fish imports fell 80.7% to $4.6m. Japan’s share of Nigeria’s global vehicle imports rose to 7.1% in 2024.

The 2026 Gulf energy shock has made Nigeria strategically relevant to Japan in a way the trade data do not yet show. Japan was the economy most exposed to the Strait of Hormuz closure, with its imports from the Gulf down 64% year on year to April 2026, and Qatar’s main LNG terminal still largely offline in September. Japanese refiners turned to Nigerian crude as an alternative supply, and Asian LNG spot prices doubled. With Brent near $100, the energy line of this corridor is set for a sharp 2026 increase, the largest single swing factor in SysIN’s outlook.

The political and institutional calendar is unusually active. The 10th Nigeria-Japan Special Partnership Forum met in Abuja on 27 August 2026, where Nigeria proposed a Nigeria-Japan Industrial and Investment Hub and both sides named critical minerals, renewable energy and agriculture as priorities; Aliko Dangote is expected to visit Japan later this year. The Bank of Japan raised its policy rate to 1.25% in September, the highest since 1995. On the Nigerian side, the CBN cut its rate to 23% on 22 September, the 2026 tariff reforms cut the effective duty on imported passenger vehicles from 70% to 40%, and the presidential election falls on 16 January 2027.

Key findings

1. A surplus in every reported year

   Nigeria’s goods-trade surplus with Japan was +$413.0m in 2021, +$991.7m in 2022, +$133.1m in 2023 and +$458.3m in 2024.

2. Energy drives the swings, not the whole relationship

   Mineral-fuel exports fell from $953.1m in 2022 to $142.2m in 2023 before recovering to $359.1m in 2024. Aluminium became the largest export line in 2023.

3. Non-fuel exports nearly doubled

   Non-fuel exports rose every year, from $259.1m in 2021 to $489.4m in 2024, up 88.9%. Aluminium, copper and sesame underpin the non-oil basket.

4. Sesame reaches a demanding Japanese market

   Oil-seed exports, overwhelmingly sesame, rose from $75.2m to $144.6m. The report cites estimates placing Nigeria’s share of Japan’s sesame imports at around 31% to 40%.

5. Vehicles now dominate Japan’s sales to Nigeria

   Vehicles rose 136.7% to $212.3m in 2024 and accounted for 54.4% of imports from Japan. Non-vehicle imports fell from about $280.3m to $177.9m.

6. The outlook is a scenario, not observed trade

   SysIN’s base case puts the surplus at roughly +$737m in 2026 and +$576m in 2027, depending on energy demand, non-oil growth and vehicle imports. The reported trade series ends in 2024.

Bilateral trade snapshot

Nigeria’s exports to Japan rose 70.7% from $783.0m (2021) to $1.34bn (2022), fell 57.4% to $568.9m (2023), and recovered 49.1% to $848.5m (2024). Japan’s exports to Nigeria were far steadier, moving from $370.0m (2021) to $344.6m (2022, −6.9%), $435.8m (2023, +26.5%) and $390.2m (2024, −10.5%). Almost all of the corridor’s volatility therefore sits on the Nigerian export side, and almost all of that volatility comes from a single product line: mineral fuels. Total two-way trade peaked at $1.68bn in 2022 and stood at $1.24bn in 2024.

The balance has been positive in every year of the series, and in every scenario considered in this brief. It peaked at +$991.7m in 2022, when high oil and gas prices after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine lifted the value of Nigerian energy shipments, narrowed to +$133.1m in 2023 when fuel exports collapsed, and widened again to +$458.3m in 2024. (The Trade Explorer’s bilateral panel displays the 2021 and 2023 balances as $413.1m and $133.2m; the $0.1m differences reflect rounding in the headline figures. The 2022 export total of $1.34bn is derived from the panel’s import and balance figures, as the headline displays only $1.3B.)

Set against Nigeria’s global trade, exports of $58.1bn to $71.6bn and imports of $48.1bn to $67.4bn, Japan took 1.35% (2021), 1.87% (2022), 0.92% (2023) and 1.33% (2024) of Nigeria’s exports, and supplied 0.65%, 0.53%, 0.65% and 0.81% of its imports. In the Trade Explorer’s destination treemaps, Japan sits in the lower half of Nigeria’s top-thirty export markets, alongside Singapore, Thailand and South Korea. Its weight in Nigeria’s trade is therefore smaller than that of Nigeria’s European and Chinese partners, but unlike most of them, it is a corridor Nigeria consistently wins.

Export profile

Nigeria’s export basket to Japan is compact but not monolithic. Mineral fuels, oils & distillation products (Ch. 27), Nigerian crude and LNG, supplied $523.9m (66.9% of the 2021 total), $953.1m (71.3%), $142.2m (25.0%) and $359.1m (42.3% of 2024). Japan has never taken more than 1.52% of Nigeria’s global fuel exports, and in 2023 took just 0.27%; for Japanese buyers, Nigerian energy has historically been a price-driven, opportunistic purchase rather than a contracted baseload supply. That is the single most important thing the 2026 Hormuz crisis could change.

A growing non-oil export base

Strip out energy and Nigeria’s exports to Japan have grown every year, from $259.1m to $489.4m. Aluminium, copper and sesame now give the corridor a non-oil floor of roughly half a billion dollars, the most diversified export profile Nigeria has with any advanced economy in this series, and one built on products Japan buys for quality, not just price.

Import profile

Japan’s exports to Nigeria have concentrated sharply into vehicles. Cars, tractors, trucks & parts (Ch. 87) rose from $89.7m (24.2% of the 2021 total) to $130.5m (37.9%), $192.6m (44.2%) and $212.3m (54.4% of 2024), and was the largest import line from 2022 onwards. This happened while Nigeria’s total vehicle import bill fell from $4.3bn (2021) to $3.0bn (2024), apart from an outlier $13.2bn reading in 2023, so Japan’s share of Nigeria’s global vehicle imports rose from 2.1% to 7.1%. Because much of Nigeria’s used-vehicle trade in Japanese brands is routed through third countries such as the United States, Belgium and the UAE, the Trade Explorer’s direct Japan-Nigeria figure understates the Japanese presence on Nigerian roads; what it captures is the direct, largely new-vehicle and parts channel.

A vehicle-led import relationship

Vehicles more than doubled to over half of all Japanese goods entering Nigeria, while fibres, fish, plastics and pharmaceuticals shrank. The industrial and technology content that TICAD 9 and JICA programming aim to expand, machinery, power equipment, grid technology, is still a small part of the flow, at $71.1m in 2024.

Bilateral relationship assessment

Unlike Nigeria’s corridors with China and, until 2023, the Netherlands, the asymmetry here runs in Nigeria’s favour on value but against it on sophistication. Nigeria sells Japan commodities and recovered metals; Japan sells Nigeria finished vehicles. The Japanese side has concentrated quickly: vehicles rose from 24.2% to 54.4% of Japan’s exports to Nigeria, while Japan’s share of Nigeria’s global vehicle import bill rose from 2.1% to 7.1%, lifted in 2024 by Nigeria’s shrinking overall vehicle imports as much as by Japanese gains. Nigeria’s April 2026 cut in the effective tariff on imported passenger vehicles from 70% to 40% is likely to push this line higher still.

Trade potential gap

The realistic opportunity in this corridor has three parts. The first and largest is energy: Japan’s urgent diversification away from the Gulf creates a window for Nigerian crude and LNG to move from spot sales to term contracts, and for Japanese utilities and traders to take positions in Nigerian gas projects. The second is value addition in the two non-oil lines: hulled, sterilised and sorted sesame rather than raw seed, and refined aluminium and copper products rather than scrap, would raise unit values into a market that pays for quality. The third, which Nigeria raised at the August 2026 Special Partnership Forum, is critical minerals: Japan has explicitly sought African rare-metal supply since TICAD 9, and Nigeria’s lithium, tin and niobium resources are currently flowing almost entirely to China. On the import side, the gap is industrial: Japanese machinery and power-grid technology, the focus of Nigeria’s TICAD 9 engagements with Toshiba and Hitachi, accounted for only $71.1m of imports in 2024.

Trade framework and development partnership

Nigeria and Japan have no bilateral free-trade, economic partnership or investment agreement in force; trade runs on WTO terms. For Nigeria’s main exports this matters relatively little, since crude, LNG, metal scrap and sesame generally face low or zero Japanese duties; the binding constraints are quality, sanitary and phytosanitary compliance, and logistics rather than tariffs. By contrast with China’s May 2026 unilateral zero-tariff offer, Japan’s engagement runs mainly through development finance and investment facilitation. At TICAD 9 in Yokohama in August 2025, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba set out ambitions for an Indian Ocean-Africa economic zone and secure access to rare metals; Nigeria secured JICA financing for renewable energy, held grid-modernisation talks with Toshiba and Hitachi, and launched a "co-creation" initiative focused on startups. In February 2026 JICA and the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority formalised a $50m Impact Innovation Fund, with a $14m JICA grant.

The Hormuz shock: Japan’s energy emergency and Nigeria’s opening

No major economy has been more exposed to the 2026 Gulf crisis than Japan. The US-Israeli war with Iran and the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz from late February 2026 cut Japan’s imports from the Gulf by 64% in the year to April, according to International Trade Centre analysis. Brent spiked above $114 within days of the disruption in March and was trading near $100 on 21 September; Asia’s benchmark LNG spot price doubled; and seven months into the disruption, Qatar’s main export terminal remains largely offline after missile damage. Japan’s central bank has cut its fiscal 2026 growth forecast to 0.5% and raised its inflation forecast, and analysts warn a prolonged closure could reduce Japanese GDP by up to 3% this year.

Sesame: Nigeria’s quiet leadership in a quality-sensitive market

Sesame is the clearest example in this series of a Nigerian non-oil product achieving market leadership in an advanced economy. Industry estimates put Nigeria as Japan’s largest sesame supplier in 2024, with around 31% of import value, and the Nigerian Export Promotion Council said in April 2026 that Nigeria controls roughly 40% of Japanese sesame imports, alongside about 20% of China’s. Japan is among the most exacting buyers of Nigerian sesame, demanding clean, uniform, low-moisture seed and strict pesticide-residue compliance. The WTO-ITC STDF 845 project, launched in 2024 to de-risk the sesame and cowpea value chains, is reported to be reducing rejections. The main risks to this line are northern Nigerian insecurity, which affects the core producing states, and competition from India, Pakistan and East Africa.

Japan: tightening at home, diversifying abroad

Japan’s macro environment is tightening. The Bank of Japan raised its policy rate by 25 basis points to 1.25% at its September 2026 meeting, the highest level since 1995, in a 7 to 2 vote responding to persistent inflation driven partly by oil prices; the yen trades near ¥157 per dollar after sliding on the decision, with markets watching for intervention. A weak yen makes Japanese vehicles and machinery cheaper in dollar terms for Nigerian buyers, but raises Japan’s cost of importing Nigerian energy and commodities. Politically, the government of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, in office since October 2025, has prioritised energy security and economic statecraft, including long-term LNG contracts negotiated at head-of-government level, which favours partners able to offer secure, long- dated supply.

Nigeria: tariff reform, easing cycle and the election clock

Nigeria’s 2026 Fiscal Policy Measures, effective 1 April, reduced import duties on 127 tariff lines and cut the total effective tariff on fully built passenger vehicles from 70% to 40%, directly supporting the fastest-growing Japanese import line. The macro backdrop has also improved: real GDP grew 4.43% in the second quarter, inflation eased to 15.39% in August, the naira has held near ₦1,331/$ with reserves around $55bn, and the CBN cut its policy rate by 350 basis points to 23% on 22 September. Nigerian crude output reached 1.68m bpd including condensate in August. The main risks lie in the political calendar, the presidential election on 16 January 2027, and in insecurity in the northern states that grow most of Nigeria’s sesame.

Our assessment: the near-term energy opportunity

The corridor’s near-term outlook hinges on energy: Japan needs non-Gulf barrels and cargoes now, and Nigeria has them. Its long-term value lies elsewhere, in sesame, processed metals and potentially critical minerals, where Nigeria already competes on quality in a demanding market. The August 2026 Special Partnership Forum and Dangote’s planned visit to Japan give Nigeria a timely platform to convert both into contracts and investment before the Hormuz window closes.

On the trajectory: 2025 to 2027 outlook

SysIN’s base case, built from the 2024 product composition and explicit price, volume and growth drivers, sees Nigerian exports to Japan easing to about $810m in 2025 on lower average oil prices, then rising to roughly $1.21bn in 2026 as Japanese buyers take more Nigerian crude and LNG during the Hormuz disruption at Brent averaging about $87, before settling near $1.09bn in 2027. Aluminium, copper and sesame continue to grow at a steady 5% to 12% a year. Japanese exports to Nigeria rise more gently, to about $425m in 2025, $475m in 2026 and $509m in 2027, led by vehicles following Nigeria’s tariff cut. Nigeria’s surplus therefore widens from $458.3m in 2024 to roughly +$737m in 2026 and +$576m in 2027. These are scenario estimates, not data: the Trade Explorer series ends in 2024.

For a trade ministry or policy body

The priority is to use the 2026 energy crisis to secure long-dated Japanese commitments: term crude and LNG supply offers to Japanese refiners and utilities, and an invitation for Japanese equity participation in Nigerian gas projects, ideally announced around Dangote’s visit to Japan and follow-up to the August Special Partnership Forum. In parallel, Nigeria should protect and upgrade its sesame leadership, scaling the STDF 845 residue-compliance model, supporting hulling and sterilisation capacity, and defending supply in northern producing states, and put critical minerals on the bilateral agenda as an alternative to exclusive dependence on Chinese offtake. The proposed Industrial and Investment Hub will need concrete incentives and a named first anchor investor to move beyond a declaration.

For a commercial institution or investor

The clearest opportunities are in export logistics and aggregation for Japan-grade sesame, where Nigeria already has market leadership but thin processing; in metals recovery and refining for Japanese secondary-metals buyers; and in trade finance for Nigerian crude and LNG cargoes to Japan while the Gulf disruption lasts. Importers and distributors of Japanese vehicles and machinery stand to benefit from Nigeria’s tariff cut, the weak yen and the CBN’s easing cycle, but should price in election-season policy risk. JICA-linked programmes, renewable energy, the NSIA Impact Innovation Fund and grid modernisation, offer co-investment entry points, with the caveat that implementation delays have historically slowed disbursement.

Data source and limitations

All bilateral trade flows are sourced from OEC BACI (Trade Explorer, UN Comtrade harmonised). Values are in USD. This brief covers goods trade only; services trade is not captured. Product-level classification follows the Harmonised System (HS) at the chapter level.